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1Performance of Transmit Antenna Selection
Physical Layer Security Schemes
Hirley Alves, Richard Demo Souza, Mérouane Debbah and Mehdi Bennis
Abstract—We analyze the physical layer (PHY) security of a
communication scheme consisting of a multiple antenna transmit-
ter with a single radio frequency (RF) chain using transmitter
antenna selection (TAS) and a single antenna receiver, in the
presence of a sophisticated multiple antenna eavesdropper. We
develop closed-form expressions for the analysis of the secrecy
outage probability, and we show that the PHY security can be
considerably enhanced when multiple antennas are available at
the legitimate transmitter. Moreover, a single RF chain multiple
antenna transmitter reduces cost, complexity, size and power
consumption at the expense of a slight loss in performance with
respect to a multiple RF chain transmitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, securing the communication over the wireless
medium at the physical layer (PHY) has gained considerable
attention [1]–[6]. A pioneering work on PHY security is that
of Wyner in [7], where it was proved that there are codes for
the wire-tap channel that guarantee both low error probabilities
and a certain degree of confidentiality. The wire-tap channel is
composed of two legitimate users, commonly known as Alice
and Bob, communicating in the presence of an eavesdropper,
known as Eve. Alice and Bob communicate through the main
channel while Eve observes through the eavesdropper channel
a degraded version of the message seen by Bob. Later, in [8]
it was demonstrated that the secrecy capacity on a Gaussian
wire-tap channel can be defined as the difference between the
capacity of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel,
being the capacity of the former greater than the latter.
In [1], [2] PHY security for a quasi-static Rayleigh fading
wire-tap channel with single antenna devices was investigated.
A different scenario was analyzed in [4] in which only the
eavesdropper has multiple antennas and the channels are
subject to quasi-static Rayleigh fading. The authors in [4]
have shown that when Selection Combining (SC) is used one
multiple antenna eavesdropper causes the same effect as of
multiple single antenna eavesdroppers. Moreover, it was shown
that the secrecy outage probability rises as the number of the
eavesdropper’s antennas increases. The authors also compared
SC to Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC) at the eavesdropper.
Their results show that MRC is more efficient than SC from
the point of view of the eavesdropper. Furthermore, in [5]
both Bob and Eve are assumed to have multiple antennas
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while Alice is a single antenna device. The authors developed
closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability,
considering that the receivers employ MRC. The results show
that the use of multiple receive antennas can enhance security,
and that the secrecy outage probability is a function of the
ratio between the number of receive antennas at Bob and Eve.
Wireless systems with multiple antennas are conceived to
increase reliability on account of diversity or to achieve high
data rates due to the presence of multiplexing gains [9]. In
the context of PHY security the multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wire-tap channel is known as MIMOME channel [3],
once all nodes have multiple antennas. For instance, in [3]
secrecy capacity expressions were derived for the Gaussian
MIMO wire-tap channel, while in [6] the authors derived
secrecy outage probability expressions for a codebook based
beamforming on the Rayleigh MISOME channel (Bob is a
single antenna device). The authors proposed a codebook
based beamforming, which means that the transmitter is using
a predefined codebook known to both transmitter and receiver
and that a feedback channel is required. However, the gains
obtained through MIMO do not come for free. The front-end
architecture is highly complex and the hardware of the radio
frequency (RF) section is expensive, while complexity and
cost increase with the number of antennas [9]–[11]. Alterna-
tively, transmit antenna selection (TAS) [10] uses a single RF
chain instead of several parallel RF sections, reducing cost,
complexity, power consumption and size at the expense of a
generally acceptable loss in performance [9]–[11].
In this work we assume a reasonable practical scenario
in which only Alice and Eve have multiple antennas while
Bob is a single antenna device. Alice could be seen as a
base station in a cellular network and Bob as regular mobile
user, while Eve is a more sophisticated device than Bob,
and therefore more likely to obtain private information. Alice
employs TAS on the main channel, which is a low cost and
complexity method for exploiting spatial diversity in multiple
antenna settings [10]–[12], while Eve employs optimum MRC.
Moreover, we consider that Bob informs Alice of the best
antenna index through an open (non-secure) and low rate
return channel. Although Eve is able to access the open return
channel, the eavesdropper will not be able to exploit this
information since Eve has access uniquely to the antenna
index, and has no channel state information (CSI) of the main
channel. Furthermore, such an antenna index is optimum for
the main channel only. Therefore, Eve is not able to exploit
any additional diversity from the multiple transmit antennas
at Alice. The main contribution of this paper is to show
that PHY security can be considerably enhanced using a low
cost and complexity single RF chain transmitter, even if the
eavesdropper is more sophisticated than the legitimate receiver.
2The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model. In Section III the secrecy outage
probability is derived. Section IV presents the numerical
results, while Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider that Alice and Eve have NA and NE antennas,
respectively, while Bob is a single antenna device. We assume
quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels, zero-mean complex
Gaussian noise and that nodes have low mobility. The receivers
have full CSI of their own channels [1]. Bob and Alice
exchange the index of Alice’s antenna with the best SNR at
Bob through an open return channel. Alice uses this index
in a TAS scheme, allowing Bob to achieve NA diversity
order. From Eve’s point of view the optimum TAS scheme
for Bob is a random TAS scheme, as the main channel and
the eavesdropper channel are uncorrelated. Thus, Eve cannot
exploit any additional spatial diversity from Alice’s antennas.
After TAS, Alice sends the message x to Bob. The signal y
received by Bob can be written as:
y =
√
PκM hM x+ nM , (1)
where P is the average transmit power, E[|x|2] ≤ P , κM =
d−αM is the path loss of the main channel, dM is the distance
between Alice and Bob, α is the path loss exponent, hM is the
Rayleigh fading coefficient of the channel between the selected
antenna from Alice and the receive antenna at Bob, while nM
is complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and power NM .
Eve is capable of eavesdropping the signal sent by Alice.
As Eve uses multiple antennas, the received signal vector z =
[z1z2...zNE ]
T at Eve is:
z =
√
PκW hW x+ nW , (2)
where κW = d−αW is the path loss of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel, dW is the distance between Alice and Eve,
hW = [hW,1hW,2...hW,NE ]
T is the fading between Al-
ice’s transmit antenna and Eve’s receive antennas, nW =
[nW,1nW,2...nW,NE ]
T is a vector of complex Gaussian noise
samples, where each nW,i has zero mean and power NW .
The instantaneous SNR at Bob is γM = P κM |hM|
2
NM
, while
the average SNR is γM =
P κME[|hM|
2]
NM
. As Eve applies MRC
among the receive antennas, we have γW = PκW
∑NE
i=1|hW,i|
2
NW
,
and γW =
P κWE[
∑NE
i=1|hW,i|
2]
NW
.
The probability density function (pdf) of γM is [12]:
fγM (γM ) =
NA
γM
· exp
(
−
γM
γM
)
·
[
1− exp
(
−
γM
γM
)]NA−1
,
(3)
and the pdf of γW is [1]:
fγW (γW ) =
γNE−1W
(NE − 1)! γ
NE
W
· exp
(
−
γW
γW
)
, (4)
The instantaneous secrecy capacity can be defined as [1]:
Cs = [CM − CW ]
+
, (5)
where
CM = log (1 + γM ) and CW = log (1 + γW ) , (6)
are respectively the instantaneous capacity of the main and
eavesdropper’s channel. Based on the non-negativity of the
channel capacity, we can rewrite the secrecy capacity as
Cs =
{
log (1 + γM )− log (1 + γW ) γM > γW
0 γM ≤ γW
(7)
Considering the independence between the main channel
and the eavesdropper’s channel, we can derive the probability
of the existence of a non-zero secrecy capacity as:
Pr[Cs > 0] = Pr[γM > γW ] (8)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γM
0
fγMγW (γM , γW )dγW dγM
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γM
0
fγM (γM )fγW (γW )dγW dγM
= 1−
NA∑
k=0
(
Na
k
)
(−1)
k
(
1 + k
γW
γM
)−NE
,
where Pr[θ] is the probability of the event θ, and
fγMγW (γM , γW ) = fγM (γM )fγW (γW ) is the joint pdf of γM
and γW . For further details see Appendix A.
When legitimate and eavesdropper nodes are all single
antenna devices (8) reduces to [1]:
Pr[Cs > 0] =
γM
γM + γW
. (9)
Due to the fact that Alice has not perfect channel knowledge
about Bob and Eve, secrecy capacity can not be guaranteed in
this scenario. It is only possible to perform a probabilistic
treatment of secrecy capacity, by means of the so called
secrecy outage probability, as we do next.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The outage probability can be defined as [2]:
O(Rs) = Pr[Cs < Rs] (11)
= Pr[Cs < Rs | γM > γW ] Pr[γM > γW ]
+ Pr[Cs < Rs | γM ≤ γW ] Pr[γM ≤ γW ],
where Rs > 0 is the secrecy rate [1], [5]. Note that, Cs = 0
when γM ≤ γW and Rs > 0, therefore Pr[Cs < Rs | γM ≤
γW ] = 1. In (8) we defined Pr[γM > γW ], consequently:
Pr[γM ≤ γW ] = 1− Pr[γM > γW ] (12)
=
NA∑
k=0
(
Na
k
)
(−1)
k
(
1 + k
γW
γM
)−NE
.
Next, we determine Pr[θ = Cs < Rs | γM > γW ], which
is given by (13) where y = 2Rs (1 + γW ) − 1. The detailed
solution of (13) is presented in Appendix B. Finally, using
(8), (12) and (13) into (11) we obtain the secrecy outage
probability for our proposed scheme, which is given by (14).
When NA = 1 (14) reduces to:
O(Rs) = 1−
γM
γM + 2
RsγW
exp
(
−
2Rs − 1
γM
)
, (15)
which is the same result as that in [1], where the authors
consider that Alice, Bob and Eve are single antenna devices.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the probability of existence of secrecy
capacity Pr[Cs > 0] for different values of NA, NE , γW = 0
dB and Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz. Moreover, throughout this paper we
assume dM = dW = 1, α = 4 and NM = NW = 1. From the
figure we can see that the probability of existence decreases
3Pr[θ] =
∫
∞
0
∫ y
γW
fγM (γM )fγW (γW )
Pr[γM > γW ]
dγMdγW =
∑NA
k=0
(
Na
k
)
(−1)k
[
e
(
−k 2
Rs−1
γM
) (
1 + k 2
Rs γW
γM
)−NE
−
(
1 + k γW
γM
)−NE]
1−
∑NA
k=0
(
Na
k
)
(−1)k
(
1 + k γW
γM
)−NE . (13)
O(Rs) =
NA∑
k=0
(
Na
k
)
(−1)
k
exp
(
−k
2Rs − 1
γM
)(
1 + k
2Rs γW
γM
)−NE
. (14)
with the increase in the number of the eavesdropper antennas.
The loss can be partially recovered by increasing the number
of antennas at Alice, and the gains in terms of SNR are around
2dB when we compare NA = 1, NE = 2 to NA = 2, NE = 2
at Pr[Cs > 0] = 0.1. Monte Carlo simulations are also shown.
Figure 2 shows the probability of existence of secrecy
capacity as a function of the number of antennas at Eve (NE),
where r = γW
γM
, γW = 0 dB and γM ∈ {3; 0;−3} dB. We can
see that the probability of existence decreases with the increase
of NE . On the other hand, it increases with the increase of NA
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Fig. 1. Probability of existence of secrecy capacity as a function of γM
when Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz, γW = 0 dB, NA ∈ {1; 2} and NE ∈ {1; 2; 4}.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy Outage Probability as a function of γM when Rs = 1
bits/s/Hz, γW = 0 dB, NA ∈ {1; 2} and NE ∈ {1; 2; 4}.
or γM and also with the decrease of NE . Figure 3 shows the
secrecy outage probability as a function of γM , NA ∈ {1; 2}
and NE ∈ {1; 2; 4}. The closed-form expression and MC
simulations match very well. From Fig. 3 we can notice that
the outage probability reduces with the increase of NA. On
the other hand, it increases with NE . Therefore, even with a
more powerful eavesdropper than Bob, our proposed scheme
can considerably enhance PHY security.
Figure 4 compares the proposed scheme to the schemes in
[5], [6], assuming a fixed secrecy rate RS = 1 bits/s/Hz and
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Fig. 4. Secrecy Outage Probability as a function of γM when Rs = 1
bits/s/Hz, γW = 0 dB, NA ∈ {1; 2} and NE ∈ {1; 2; 4}.
4Pr[Cs > 0] =
∫
∞
0

NA · e
(
−
γM
γM
)
γM
·
[
1− e
(
−
γM
γM
)]NA−1
−
NA · e
(
−
γM
γM
)
· Γ
(
NE ,
γM
γW
)
Γ (NE) γM
·
[
1− e
(
−
γM
γM
)]NA−1
 dγM
= 1− I1. (16)
Pr[θ] = A ·
∫
∞
0

e
(
−
γW
γW
)
·
[
1− e
(
−
2Rs (γW+1)−1
γM
)]NA
· γ
NE−1
W − e
(
−
γW
γW
)
·
[
1− e
(
−
γW
γM
)]NA
· γ
NE−1
W
}
dγW ,
= A ·
[
f
(
NE − 1, NA,
1
γW
,
2Rs
γM
,−e
(
−
2Rs−1
γM
))
− f (NE − 1, NA,
1
γW
,
1
γM
,−1)
]
, A =
γ
NE
W
Γ(NE) · Pr[γM > γW ]
(22)
γW = 0 dB. In [5], Eve and Bob have multiple antennas
and apply MRC, while Alice is a single antenna device.
The authors in [6] proposed a codebook based beamform-
ing (CBBF) and also analyze the naive beamforming (NBF)
scheme. In CBBF the amount of information that has to be sent
from Bob to Alice is limited and depends on the size of the
codebook, while in NBF Bob transmits to Alice the complete
CSI, requiring in theory an unlimited and unrealistic amount
of feedback. From the figure we can see that the proposed
scheme performs close to CBBF1 and outperforms the MRC
scheme. The conclusions hold for different values of Rs and
γW . Furthermore, we emphasize that TAS requires only a
single RF chain which considerably reduces cost, complexity,
power consumption and size [9], while CBBF and NBF utilize
NA RF chains. Moreover, our proposed scheme requires only
a low rate return channel once few bits have to be fed back
(⌈log(NA)⌉ bits).
V. CONCLUSION
We analytically investigated the secrecy when Alice is a
multiple antenna transmitter with single RF chain, Bob is a
single antenna device, and Eve is a sophisticated multiple
antenna device. We developed closed-form expressions for the
secrecy outage probability. Our results show that high levels
of security can be achieved when the number of antennas at
Alice increases, even when Eve has multiple antennas. The
proposed TAS scheme requires only a single RF chain which
considerably reduces cost, complexity, power consumption and
size at the expense of a very small loss in performance when
compared to a multiple RF chain scheme.
APPENDIX A
PROBABILITY OF EXISTENCE
Consider Pr[Cs > 0] in (16), where I1 can be rewritten as:
I1 =
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
γM
γW
)
·
[
1− exp
(
−
γM
γM
)]NA
· γ
NE−1
M dγM
γ
NE
W Γ (NE)
, (17)
where Γ(·, ·) is the upper incomplete gamma function [13,
Chap. 6]. Now let f (·) = f (n,m, p, q, a) be:
f (·) =
∫
∞
0
exp (−p t) · [1 + a exp (−q t)]m · tndt (18)
=
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
a
k
∫
∞
0
exp (−t (p+ kq)) · tndt (19)
=
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
a
k Γ(n+ 1)
(p + kq)n+1
. (20)
1We assume a coding design criteria δ = 1
2
for CBBF [6].
For obtaining (20) we first expand the binomial term in (18),
then we apply a variable substitution v = t(p + kq), which
results in the Gamma function [13, Chap. 6]. Thus, applying
(20) in (17) yields:
I1 =
γ−NEW
Γ (NE)
· f (NE − 1, NA,
1
γW
,
1
γM
,−1)
=
NA∑
k=0
(
Na
k
)
(−1)
k
(
1 + k
γW
γM
)−NE
. (21)
Finally, taking the result of (21) and putting it into (16) we
have the probability of existence as shown in (8).
APPENDIX B
Here we analyze Pr[θ = Cs < Rs | γM > γW ] , which
is given by (13). We can rewrite the integral in (13) as (22),
then resorting to (20) and after a few algebraic manipulations
we have the solution for Pr[θ] as shown in (13).
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